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1 Unequal Access to Foreign Spaces: 
How States Use Visa Restrictions to Regulate Mobility in a Globalised World 
 
Nation-states employ visa restrictions to manage the complex trade-off 
between facilitating the entrance to their territory by passport holders 
from certain countries for economic and political reasons and deterring 
individuals from other countries for reasons of perceived security and 
immigration-control. The resulting system is one of highly unequal 
access to foreign spaces, reinforcing existing inequalities. Trans-
national mobility is encouraged for passport holders from privileged 
nations, particularly rich Western countries, at the expense of severe 
restrictions for others. Visa restrictions manifest states’ unfaltering 
willingness to monitor, regulate and control entrance to their territory 
in a globalised world. 
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2 Introduction 
Travellers nowadays need passports or other documents, which only nation-states 
have the right to issue, in order to enter foreign spaces, together with a valid visa 
depending on which passport they hold and where they want to travel to. However, 
the modern system of passports and visa restrictions has only gradually evolved over 
time. While passports and visas in one form or another have existed since medieval 
times, the comprehensive system as we know it is inextricably linked to the evolution 
of the modern nation-state, ‘the almost inevitable outcome of the Westphalian state’ 
(Anderson 2000, 18). Torpey (1998, 2000) argues that nation-states have successfully 
managed over time to monopolize and usurp the authority to determine who may 
enter their external borders, which came together with the victory of the principle of 
national sovereignty.
1 Nation-state sovereignty understood as the principle of non-
interference in internal matters might have weakened in recent decades, but few, if 
any, deny nation-states the right to control and restrict entry into their territory. Such 
controls and restrictions have ‘historically been viewed as inherent in the very nature 
of sovereignty’ (Collinson 1996, 77). 
As Sassen (1996, 1998) notes, nowhere in international law is there a right to 
enter foreign spaces. Even the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
only postulates a right of exit and entry to one’s own country (article 13). In order to 
                                                 
1 Nation-states also often exert control over who may exit their territory. In some countries it is very 
difficult for certain groups of people to gain a passport that is a necessity for foreign travel. 
Authoritarian regimes are not the only ones guilty of such practices. In the 1950s and early 1960s, 
hundreds of Americans suspected of being sympathetic to Communism were denied passports and thus 
barred from travel abroad (Rogers 1985). Some countries also severely restrict the movement of people 
within their territory (Torpey 1998, 2000). These issues are outside the scope of the present article, 
however, which focuses on the control of entry into foreign spaces via visa restrictions. 
3 guarantee security and order a state has to keep a close eye on who enters its territory 
and must be free in its decision to refuse entry, argued Bertelsmann (1914, 11) in his 
study on the passport system just before the First World War. More than ninety years 
later, states still subscribe to this view with few amendments. If anything, it has seen a 
revival in the wake of 9/11 as well as the increasingly hostile reaction to asylum and 
other migration to Western high-income countries (UN 2002). 
Yet, at the same time as nation-states cling to their prerogative to control entry, 
economic and political imperatives also call for permeable borders. Already the 
League of Nations in the inter-War period and, after World War II, the Council of 
Europe reminded nation-states that visa restrictions inhibit international trade and 
tourism (Salter 2003). Over the last two to three decades, globalisation has led to a 
degree of cross-border mobility never known before. Globalisation has seemingly 
created a world ‘where borders and boundaries have become increasingly porous’ and 
where ‘people readily (although certainly not freely and without difficulty) cut across 
national boundaries’ (Inda and Rosaldo 2002, 2f.). Certain groups of countries have 
set up passport unions and harmonized visa policies in order to facilitate travel and the 
exchange of goods, services and ideas. Many have argued that the unprecedented 
demand for mobility undermines the state’s ability and willingness to exercise 
stringent controls of who enters its national borders (Cornelius, Martin and Hollifield 
1994; Bigo 1998). Such stringent controls are apparently against states’ economic 
interests. For example, Flynn (2000, 58) argues that they would ‘place governments 
on a collision course with easy trade, which is key to the sustained expansion and 
integration of the global economy’. Stringent controls also run counter to the 
expansion of human and civil rights to resident immigrants (Sassen 1996, 1998). They 
would, in the words of Bigo (1998, 160), ‘put at risk economic prosperity and 
4 political liberties associated with open societies’. Do these developments constrain the 
sovereignty of nation-states against their will, are they simply ‘losing control?’ 
(Sassen 1996). 
There can be no doubt that cross-national movement, both short-term and long-
term, has increased dramatically over the last three decades in the wake of revolutions 
in communication and transportation technologies that gave rise to what Harvey 
(1989) has termed the process of ‘time-space compression’. International arrivals 
increased from 166 million in 1970 to 702 million in 2002 (WTO 1995, 2003). The 
number of migrants, that is people residing in countries other than their country of 
birth, has doubled since 1970 to 175 million (UN 2002). This study demonstrates how 
nation-states employ bilateral visa restrictions in an attempt to manage the complex 
trade-off between facilitating and promoting economic and political interests on the 
one hand and maintaining immigration control and upholding security on the other 
hand. As a consequence of this trade-off, a system has been put in place that is highly 
unequal in granting easy access to foreign spaces. The restrictions to freedom and 
difficulties in crossing national borders admitted to by Inda and Rosaldo (2002) turn 
out to be highly unevenly distributed across people with different nationalities. 
Facilitating the mobility of some is achieved at the expense of inhibiting and deterring 
mobility of others. Not passports as such, as Salter (2003, 2) seems to suggest, but the 
visa restrictions imposed on passport holders from certain countries are one of the 
most important mechanisms, with which nation states exert their prerogative to 
control entry into their territory. I will describe and characterize the system of 
bilateral visa restrictions, put forward hypotheses with regards to its determinants and 
test these hypotheses empirically.  
5 To my knowledge, despite its significance in restricting travel opportunities for 
billions of people, no such analysis has ever been undertaken, neither by political 
scientists, scholars of international relations nor geographers. Many others have noted 
the strange paucity of research on the topic of international passports, visa restrictions 
and the like (e.g., O’Byrne 2001, 399). Salter (2003, 152) sees a great gap in the 
extent scholarship and explicitly calls for a research program that includes a ‘study of 
the international visa regime’. It is this specific gap that this article attempts to fill. 
The study of visa restrictions should be of great interest to geographers, not only 
because access to foreign spaces is an inherently geographical topic, but also because 
it directly relates to many issues, which have long since been at the top of 
geographical debate. For example, visa restrictions directly relate to the issue of 
governments’ attempt to control and ultimately deter immigration from certain groups 
of people, they are pertinent to debates on whether or not borders have become more 
permeable in a Globalised world undermining the sovereignty of nation-states and 
they represent an important manifestation of inequalities imposed on people on the 
basis of nationality. 
 
Why states impose visa restrictions 
Every state faces the dilemma between facilitating the cross-border flow of people for 
its own economic and political benefit on the one hand and monitoring, controlling 
and limiting that same flow for its perceived security interest on the other hand. In 
order to understand the system of bilateral visa restrictions, one must therefore look at 
why countries want to encourage (or at least not discourage) the inflow of people 
from certain countries, but want to deter the inflow of people from other countries.  
6 Let us start with the motivations for keeping people out. One obvious concern is 
that visitors might turn into immigrants in staying on (illegally) in the country instead 
of returning back home. This concern is particularly raised by policy makers of 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Economic Development (OECD) 
countries who have become increasingly anti-immigrationist (Black 1996; UN 2002; 
Cunningham 2004), mainly for economic reasons, but partly also because immigrants 
are increasingly regarded as a threat to social and ethno-cultural stability (Samers 
1997; Nevins 2002; Purcell and Nevins 2005). Greatly improved communication 
links, global television networks and the breakthrough of more affordable and faster 
transportation links in the wake of globalisation have meant that the potential of 
immigration has hugely increased. Pictures of apparent material affluence being 
broadcasted into the cities and villages of poor countries buttressed by mass tourism 
of Westerners, cheaper telephone calls and more affordable flights means that would-
be immigrants have more information, better contact and easier travel access to 
OECD countries. At the same time, the factors pushing people toward migration such 
as poverty, political repression, human rights abuse, war and civil conflict have not 
eased off (Neumayer 2005). 
Northern Africans trying to enter Southern Italy by night via unregistered and 
unofficial boats, Mexicans trying to cross the border to Texas illegally and Asians 
being rescued in the middle of the Pacific Ocean from a shipwreck on its way to 
Australia are the most televised and publicly known efforts to enter the promised land 
of OECD countries. However, despite their great salience, they are not the major 
pathways to illegal immigration. Bigo (1998, 152) reports from discussions with 
French Schengen Officials and the Central Directorate for the repression of illegal 
immigration and employment that only 20% of illegal immigrants crossed the border 
7 illegally, whereas the vast majority entered the country perfectly legally, but then 
simply overstayed the allowed period of time. Andreas (1998, 607) reports a higher 
share of individuals crossing the border illegally for the United States (50 to 60%) 
despite the increasing militarisation of the U.S.-Mexican border (Nevins 2002). But 
even so an estimated number of 150,000 people each year overstay their visa with the 
intention of settlement. 
Visa restrictions represent an important deterrent against would-be immigrants. 
First, there is the additional cost and hassle of applying for the visa either via post, 
which can take weeks or months, or in person, which implies travelling to the 
embassy or one of the few consulates and waiting in the queue, possibly for hours. 
Second, the issuing consulate or embassy can of course deny the application without 
giving any reason. As Torpey (1998, 252) has put it: ‘At a time when substantial but 
unknown numbers of people become “immigrants” simply by overstaying the legally 
prescribed duration of their stay, limiting ingress is the best way for states to avoid 
entering into a series of potentially costly obligations to nonnationals. Passport and 
visa controls are crucial mechanisms for this purpose, the “first line of defense” 
against the entry of undesirables.’ 
It is no coincidence that one of the major policy consequences taken by Western 
European countries in the 1990s in response to the rising flow of asylum applications 
was the set-up of a common policy of visa restrictions, together with a system of 
penalties on airlines carrying passengers without a valid visa.
2 Council Regulation 
2317, adopted in 1995, provided the first common list of countries and has been 
                                                 
2 This is reminiscent of the fact that European governments of the 19
th and early 20
th century required 
steamship companies to check whether individuals had the right to travel to their chosen destination 
(Torpey 1998, 243). 
8 updated continuously since then. It was based on an earlier provision of the Schengen 
Implementation Agreement from 1990 (Jileva 2002). This regulation forms part of the 
Schengen acquis, which became part of the EU treaty system with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, and is regarded as essential for lowering the internal border controls within the 
Schengen area. Today, all European Union countries with the exception of Ireland and 
the United Kingdom plus Iceland and Norway succumb to an identical list of 
countries whose passport holders must be in possession of a valid visa for crossing the 
external borders of the Member States.
3 Starting out with 73 countries on the list, the 
number of countries facing common visa restrictions to all Schengen countries 
increased to 108 in the 1995 regulation and to 132 in the 2001 regulation. The 
increase in external border controls together with an increasingly more comprehensive 
common country list of visa restrictions was inextricably linked to and a precondition 
for the abolition of internal border controls (Wiener 1998). Enhanced freedom of 
movement for insiders was achieved at the expense of decreased mobility for certain 
outsiders, namely those on the list of countries in need of a visa for entry, prompting 
critics to speak of efforts to create a “fortress Europe” and a “wall around the West” 
(Richmond 1994; Andreas and Synder 2000). Former Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kuchma warned that the Schengen visa rules would ‘replace the Iron Curtain with a 
different, more humane but no less dangerous Paper Curtain’ (quoted in Lavenex and 
Uçarer 2004, 433f.). 
                                                 
3 Ireland was unwilling to give up its bilateral free movement agreement with the UK, which it would 
have had to sacrifice in order to become part of the Schengen area. Denmark retains the right to accept 
decisions taken within the Schengen framework on an individual basis, but has accepted the EU’s 
common list of countries whose passport holders need a visa for entry (Anderson 2000). 
9 Visa restrictions fulfil the double role of pre-selection and deterrence: Those who 
do not need a visa are regarded as desirable and low-risk visitors by default, those 
who need a visa and have been approved by the country’s consulate or embassy 
abroad are regarded as not undesirable and not representing a great risk upon closer 
inspection, whereas those who need a visa and do not have one are denied access. To 
be sure, even if no visa is needed or a visa has been attained, the final decision of 
whether one can enter a foreign space is made at the border itself and there is always 
the risk of being rejected despite being in possession of a valid visa. However, this 
risk is rather small in reality, which is why the pre-selection role of the system of visa 
restrictions is so important. This importance is further heightened by the fact that it 
might not be possible to send people whose entry is rejected back to their home 
country. True, in principle the passport ‘provides an assurance for the State of transit 
or destination that the bearer can return to the State which issued the passport’ (ICAO 
2004, 13). In other words, in principle the passport guarantees that those denied 
access can be sent back to the issuing country. However, there have been many cases 
where countries have refused to take their nationals back, prompting OECD country 
governments to bribe with financial aid sending country governments into concluding 
readmission agreements (UN 2002). Also, asylum seekers sometimes destroy their 
passports and other travel documents so that the country denying access to them has 
nowhere to send them to. It is exactly for this reason that many countries require 
airlines not to let anyone enter the aircraft who is not in the possession of a valid visa 
(if required to do so). Otherwise the dual purpose of visa restrictions, pre-selection 
and deterrence, would be defeated. Reportedly, in their efforts to comply, airlines 
have refused potential asylum-seekers to board flights, ‘flagrantly discriminating 
against non-European passengers, and even going so far as to kidnap passengers to 
10 prevent them from presenting themselves to airport immigration authorities’ (Cruz 
1995, 3) without a valid passport and visa. Increasingly, sanctions are applied to sea 
and ground transport companies as well (UN 2002). 
The importance of visa restrictions in combating immigration to European Union 
countries can be illustrated by three facts. First, Article 100c of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community calls for introducing visa restrictions on 
countries, which enjoyed visa-free travel before, ‘in the event of an emergency 
situation in a third country posing a threat of a sudden inflow of nationals from that 
country into the Community’. Second, Romania (and before that Bulgaria) was only 
included in the list of countries being exempt from visa requirements after it had 
convinced the European Commission that it had made ‘undeniable progress (…) as 
regards illegal immigration from its country, its visa policy and the controls at its 
borders’ (European Communities 2001a). Third, the new EU member countries of 
Eastern Europe had to accept the existing list of countries and had to impose visa 
restrictions on third countries such as Moldova, Russia and the Ukraine despite the 
fact that they had not had such restrictions in place before accession to the EU and 
have economic, political or cultural ties with these countries (Jileva 2002, 2004). 
After the restrictions came into force, cross-border tourism and trade travel fell 
sharply. Other countries eager to join the EU, such as Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey 
already implement changes to their visa policies anticipating that they will have to cut 
old ties in order to gain new membership (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004). On the other 
side of the Atlantic, US authorities removed Argentina and Uruguay from the list of 
countries enjoying visa-free travel to the US when too many passport holders from 
these countries attempted to overstay their allowed 90-day period or were denied 
admission at the border (Siskin 2004). Indeed, to qualify for visa-free travel to the US, 
11 countries must maintain a very low “disqualification rate” of below 2 per cent on 
average over time, defined as the percentage of national passport holders violating the 
conditions of their entry allowance or being rejected or withdrawing their application 
at the border (Siskin 2004). 
Besides immigration, another big concern to many states is the infiltration by 
potential terrorists, criminals such as drug traffickers and other persona non grata. In 
the past, entry has also been denied to people with infectious diseases (Slater 2003, 
ch. 3). However, some high-profile cases of visa restrictions on HIV-infected persons 
notwithstanding (Ezzell 1989; Garmaise 2002), the focus of concern is now clearly on 
threats to regime stability by politically undesirable individuals and threats to national 
security by politically motivated violence and trans-national networks of crime. Long 
before 9/11, autocratic regimes have always been suspicious that foreign influence 
might undermine the regime’s foundations and have therefore been eager to keep an 
eye on who enters the country. The more autocratic and repressive a regime is, the 
more it is threatened by open borders (Anderson 2000). Visa restrictions represent an 
important mechanism to monitor and control entry. One would therefore expect that 
democracies, all other things equal, are more liberal with their system of visa 
restrictions than autocracies are. 
Too liberal, indeed, in the eyes of those concerned with national security, 
particularly in the United States after 9/11. Despite the fact that all terrorists 
participating in the attack on the World Trade Centre entered the United States on 
valid visa
4, the US has severely restricted the issue of visas since then. This has 
                                                 
4 Mohamad Atta and Marwan Alshahhi, the two pilots of the planes crashing into the World Trade 
Center towers, entered the US on a valid visitor visa, but applied for a change to status of students, 
12 created much concern among business groups, research centres and universities of 
undue delay in granting visas and keeping out students, scientists and businessmen 
whose entry would be beneficial to US interests (Froelich 2004; Bhattacharjee 2004). 
That passport holders from certain countries do not need visas to enter many other 
countries has prompted security experts to worry about passports from these countries 
being stolen or forged to gain easier access and to circumvent the necessity to obtain a 
visa. Passports from EU countries have ‘become the world’s most popular travel 
documents to forge, counterfeit or steal’ (Fuller 2002). Criminals and terrorists 
appreciate EU passports since they offer visa-free travel in many parts of the world, 
whereas ‘illegal’ immigrants appreciate them for entering and working within the EU 
without restriction. The travel opportunities opened up by the possession of an EU or 
other OECD country passport, stolen or forged, are so great that they carry a high 
price in the black market. To combat this problem, some countries, with the US at the 
forefront, now require passport holders who do not need a visa to enter the country to 
have machine-readable passports, with which stolen passports can more easily be 
traced (Slater 2004). To the dismay of the travel industry, other business groups and 
universities, individuals without such passports now need a visa to enter the US, but 
US officials claim that the new system has allowed them to detain more than 200 
persons suspected of criminal convictions or immigration violations within a matter of 
months (Anonymous 2004). In the future, these machine-readable passports also need 
to contain biometric identifiers, with which the identity of the passport holder can be 
uniquely determined (Siskin 2004). Similarly, counterfeit-proof visa stamps are 
introduced to counter the rise in forged visa stamps (UN 2002). As with passports, the 
                                                                                                                                            
which was granted since US authorities regarded students as low-risk travellers at the time (Salter 
2004, 84f.). 
13 development of a black market in visas is the inevitable consequence of a restrictive 
system. Corrupt officials at German embassies and consulates in the Ukraine, Russia, 
Albania and the Kosovo selling tens of thousands of visas illegally to individuals, 
whose visa applications would have normally been denied, prompted an inquiry in the 
federal parliament that might still lead to the resignation of Germany’s Foreign 
Minister (FAZ 2005). 
 
Why states refrain from imposing visa restrictions 
From the considerations so far it follows that, conversely, countries might refrain 
from imposing visa restrictions on passport holders from other countries from which 
they do not fear illegal immigration or the entrance of unwanted individuals. 
However, the absence of restrictions cannot only be motivated by the absence of 
concerns, but also by actual positive incentives to facilitate international travel. Most 
policy makers now subscribe to the view that international trade, foreign investment, 
tourism, scientific, business and other contacts are desirable for mainly economic 
reasons. Hence one would expect that countries that trade much with each other 
would want to facilitate the international exchange of goods and services by providing 
easy access to each other’s spaces. Poorer countries have an incentive to exempt 
passport holders from high-income countries from visa restrictions in the hope of 
bolstering foreign investment and knowledge spill-overs into their country. Major 
tourist destinations have an incentive not to impose visa restrictions on sending 
countries in order to remain attractive in the increasingly competitive market for mass 
tourism. O’Byrne (2001) argues that the relaxation of visa requirements in many 
countries can be explained as a direct response to the demands by the tourism industry 
to whom ‘freedom of travel is freedom to trade’ (emphasis in original). As a caveat, 
14 visa restrictions can represent a simple way of raising a good deal of foreign currency
5 
for a major tourist destination. Of course, the revenue from visa applications has to be 
balanced against the costs of processing the application and the opportunity costs of 
deterring potential visitors. This motive therefore only makes sense in the few cases 
where the visa can be obtained at the border itself, the procedure of getting it is often 
extremely simple and does not involve any major check on the applicant. Egypt is a 
good example for this where passport holders from OECD and other major tourist 
sending countries need a visa, but can obtain one at the border for a fee of US$15 
without complication. With an estimated number of arrivals in 2000 of around 5 
million people, this might have generated a revenue of up to US$75 million. 
But besides economic reasons, there are likely to exist also important political 
reasons why countries do not want to impose visa restrictions on passport holders 
from certain other countries. Such restrictions are likely to be regarded as an 
unfriendly act, as a sign of suspicion against the citizens of the affected country. 
Indeed, while such restrictions are affected by the relations between two states (Wang 
2004), they also affect the relations between two states. Countries are therefore likely 
not to impose visa restrictions on other countries, with which they share the same 
geographical region or civilization. Historical links such as former colonial 
experience can also play a role. Historical, geographical and civilisational patterns of 
shared belonging are likely to influence visa restrictions given that the latter are 
powerful manifestations of inclusion and exclusion. Granting visa-free access to one’s 
territorial space is perhaps the most welcoming thing that can be done for passport 
holders from other nations, short of a full passport union. Full passport unions, where 
travel between the union members is not only visa-free, but also possible with identity 
                                                 
5 This point had already been noted by Bertelsmann (1914). 
15 cards other than a passport, are a rather rare phenomenon. The Nordic Union 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), the Schengen area, the UK-Ireland 
union and the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates) are the only currently functioning unions (Salter 
2003). 
The mixture of motivations driving the bilateral system of visa restrictions is 
clearly discernible from the European Union’s Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, 
which lists ‘the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when 
crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement’. The preamble to the regulation states that ‘the determination of those 
third countries whose nationals are subject to the visa requirement, and those exempt 
from it, is governed by a considered, case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria 
relating  inter alia to illegal immigration, public policy and security, and to the 
European Union’s external relations with third countries, consideration also being 
given to the implications of regional coherence and reciprocity’ (European 
Communities 2001b, emphasis in original). 
 
Empirical analysis 
So far, hypotheses have been put forward with regards to the reasons why states 
impose visa restrictions on passport holders from certain countries, but allow visa-free 
travel for individuals from other countries. In this section, these hypotheses will be 
put to a rigorous formal statistical analysis to see whether they can explain well the 
existing system of visa restrictions. In addition, summary statistics and descriptive 
information are used to illustrate the extent to which the system provides highly 
16 unequal access to foreign spaces reinforcing existing inequalities and disparities 
between the rich and the poor nations of the world. 
Information on bilateral visa restrictions for 189 sovereign nation-states as well 
as Hong Kong and Macao is taken from the November 2004 edition of the 
International Civil Aviation Association’s Travel Information Manual (IATA 2004). 
Used by the vast majority of airlines and travel bureaus, this manual provides 
authoritative information on restrictions in place. Ideally, one would like to trace 
changes in restrictions over time, but with approximately 36,300 relevant country 
pairs (so-called dyads) doing so would be prohibitively costly in terms of effort (it 
took several months to input the existing data).
6
Let us start with some descriptive information and summary statistics. The very 
end of the justification for imposing visa restrictions given by the EU in its Council 
Regulation No 539/2001 quoted in the last section above points toward the fact that 
countries seem to pursue, to some extent at least, the principle of reciprocity where 
they are likely to respond with visa restrictions on passport holders from a certain 
country if that country imposes such restrictions on one’s own nationals and vice 
versa. Generally speaking, there is a relatively high degree of reciprocity in visa 
restrictions. Around 68 per cent of country dyads have mutually consistent restrictions 
in place in the sense that they either impose or do not impose such restrictions on each 
other. However, for the OECD countries the degree of reciprocity is far lower at 48 
per cent (71 per cent for non-OECD countries). As one will see below, this is because 
OECD passport holders enjoy much fewer restrictions for travelling abroad than their 
countries impose on passport holders from other countries. 
                                                 
6 Due to lack of data for the explanatory variables, the statistical analysis is based on a smaller sample 
size. 
17 OECD countries use their political power to maintain these inequalities. Thus 
whilst the European Union’s above-mentioned Council Regulation on visa restrictions 
threatens any country being exempt from visa regulations entering the Schengen area 
with a review of its status should it decide ‘to make the national of one or more 
Member States [of the European Union] subject to the visa obligation’ (European 
Communities 2001b), it has no problem with the fact that it imposes visa restrictions 
on many third countries who grant nationals from EU countries visa-free entry. 
Similarly, in order to be granted visa-free access to the United States, it is a 
prerequisite for countries to offer reciprocal privileges to United States passport 
holders, but offering such privileges does not at all provide countries with visa-free 
access to the US (Siskin 2004). 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the system of bilateral visa restrictions is thus 
the great degree of inequality in access to foreign spaces. Holders of certain passports 
face much fewer visa restrictions for travelling abroad and therefore have much easier 
access to foreign spaces than holders of other passports. The passport holders from the 
25 countries facing the smallest number of visa restrictions are all Western high-
income OECD countries, with the exceptions of Malaysia and Singapore, which are 
also relatively high-income countries of course. At the bottom are passport holders 
from countries that need to have a visa for travel to almost any foreign country. This 
group is more mixed, but generally consists of countries with a history of violent 
political conflict (e.g., Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia), countries with a strictly autocratic 
regime (e.g., Northern Korea and Myanmar), very poor countries (e.g., Ethiopia and 
Haiti) or countries with some combination of these aspects. In these countries, holding 
a valid visa is almost the defining condition for being able to travel abroad. 
18 If gaining access to foreign spaces is highly unequally distributed, so is granting 
access to one’s own space. Some countries whose passport holders face a high 
number of visa restrictions are also in the top group of countries imposing visa 
restrictions on passport holders from other countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Somalia, 
Myanmar, Northern Korea). In this sense, there is some symmetry between facing 
visa restrictions and imposing visa restrictions on others. However, countries whose 
passport holders face a low number of visa restrictions are typically not among the 
group of countries imposing relatively few restrictions on other countries. With the 
exceptions of Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, none of the Western 
high-income countries is in the group of 25 countries imposing the lowest number of 
visa restrictions. Instead, it consists mainly of small island countries (e.g., Barbados, 
Maldives, Micronesia, Haiti, Jamaica). 
On average, OECD countries do not have a number of visa restrictions in place 
that differs in a statistically significant way from the number of restrictions imposed 
by non-OECD countries (around 150 in both cases). However, whereas the average 
OECD citizen faces visa restrictions in travel to approximately 93 foreign countries, 
the average non-OECD citizen needs a visa to travel to approximately 156 countries. 
Passport holders of OECD countries therefore enjoy relatively easy access to foreign 
spaces, but OECD countries do not generally provide easy access to their own spaces. 
Kumar (2000, 20f.) summarizes the inequality in access to foreign spaces succinctly 
as follows: ‘For those who live in affluent countries, the passport is of use for 
international travel in connection with business or vacations’, whereas for those living 
in the poorer nations of the world ‘the passport is without any value if it does not have 
the visa. In other words, it is meaningless as a passport’. 
19 Turning to the formal empirical analysis, the choice of explanatory variables is 
driven by the hypotheses put forward in the sections above. One would expect that 
visa restrictions are more likely to be in place for passport holders from poor, 
politically repressive countries with a history of violent conflict. This is because all 
these factors are well-established push factors for asylum and other migration 
(Neumayer 2005). In addition, visa restrictions against undemocratic countries or 
countries with political conflict might also serve national security concerns. With an 
emphasis on all other things being equal, one would also expect that democracies 
impose fewer restrictions than more autocratic regimes. In order to facilitate mobility, 
one would expect dyads, which trade much with one another, to be less likely to have 
restrictions in place. The same is true for countries that highly depend on tourism. 
Conversely, passport holders from major tourist-sending countries are less likely to 
face visa restrictions going abroad. Travel is likely to be visa-free for countries with a 
former colonial link and countries from the same geographical region as well as 
civilization, contested as the latter concept might be. The appendix provides the exact 
definition of these variables as well as the sources of data. Table I provides summary 
descriptive variable statistics. 
The dependent variable is dichotomous (1 = visa restrictions in place; 0 = no 
restrictions in place), which calls for the use of a non-linear estimator such as probit 
or logit. I employ logit, but probit leads to qualitatively very similar results. Standard 
errors are obtained from a so-called robust variance estimator to account for the fact 
that the variance of the unobservable error term might not be constant 
(heteroskedasticity). 
The estimated results reported in table II provide clear evidence for the use of 
visa restrictions to deter unwanted entry. The poorer, the less democratic and the more 
20 exposed to armed political conflict the target country is, the more likely that visa 
restrictions are in place against its passport holders. Yet, at the same time, there is also 
unambiguous evidence on how visa-free travel is granted in order to encourage 
desirable entry. Major tourist sending countries are less likely to face restrictions, 
whereas major tourist destinations are less likely to impose restrictions. Dyads with 
more bilateral trade are less likely to impose visa restrictions on each other. Regional 
and civilisational ties render visa restrictions less likely. Former colonial links as such 
have no impact on the visa regime, but Commonwealth countries are more likely to 
grant visa-free travel for each other. More democratic countries impose fewer visa 
restrictions on passport holders from foreign countries. 
The explanatory power of the estimated model is quite good. At the mean of 
explanatory variables, the model predicts that 75.6 per cent of all dyads have visa 
restrictions in place – not far off the actual observed frequency of about 78 per cent. 
With a very large sample size, variables tend to be statistically significantly different 
from zero, but their substantial importance can be very small. To explore this, one can 
assess the actual impact of varying the explanatory variables on the likelihood of visa 
restrictions being in place. Unfortunately, contrary to the linear ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimator, probit or logit coefficients have no direct easy-to-understand 
interpretation. We will therefore now look at changes in predicted values, which are 
easier to understand. Unfortunately, the estimated probabilities are contingent on 
specific values of the explanatory variables because the logit and probit models are 
non-linear, and therefore non-additive, in the probabilities. We will look at the impact 
of changing a variable from its minimum to its maximum. That is, we look at the 
change in predicted probability comparing a very poor to a very rich targeted country, 
a very repressive to a very rights-protecting country, comparing a country within the 
21 same geographical region to one outside and so on. The disadvantage is that one 
needs to set the remaining variables at a certain level, for which for simplicity we 
choose the average value. Table III reports the results. A very poor country has visa 
restrictions imposed on its national passport holders with a predicted probability of 
88%, whereas a very rich country has a probability of only 34% (holding all other 
variables at their mean). Since there are a multitude of countries deciding on whether 
or not to impose a visa restriction, another way of interpreting the estimated results is 
that passport holders from a very poor nation are predicted to face visa restrictions in 
travelling to 88% of all other countries, whereas a passport holder from a very rich 
nation is predicted to face such restrictions in only about a third of other countries. 
This demonstrates again the great inequality in access to foreign spaces reinforcing 
existing inequalities between rich and poor nations. Very repressive countries are 
predicted to encounter visa restrictions in 93% of other countries, whereas very rights-
protecting countries do so only in 73% of cases. The respective predicted probabilities 
for peaceful countries are 82% and for war-torn countries 89%. 
A liberal rights-protecting democracy is predicted to impose visa restrictions on 
62% of all other countries, whereas a very repressive regime does so in 96% of cases, 
i.e. is predicted to impose visa restrictions on almost all other countries. For the 
regional and civilisational dummy variables, the best way of interpretation is that a 
passport holder on average faces a visa restriction travelling to a country outside its 
region or civilization with a predicted probability of 85%, but with a predicted 
probability of 66% and 70% if travelling to a country within its region or civilization, 
respectively. Passport holders from Commonwealth countries on average need a visa 
in 83% of cases travelling abroad to a country outside the Commonwealth, but this 
falls by a predicted 17 percentage points if travelling to another Commonwealth 
22 country. A country very heavily reliant on receipts from tourism is 13 percentage 
points less likely to impose a visa restriction than a country with no tourism (71% as 
opposed to 84% predicted probability). Passport holders from major tourist sending 
countries are 10 percentage points less likely facing visa restrictions going abroad 
than individuals from countries with virtually no tourists going abroad (73% as 
opposed to 83%). Countries with no bilateral trade are predicted to have visa 
restrictions in place in 82.6% of all cases, whereas country pairs with very large 
bilateral trade are very unlikely to have a visa restriction in place (predicted 
probability close to zero). 
 
Conclusion 
Taking up the issue of states’ apparent faltering willingness and ability to control 
entry into their territories, as far as willingness is concerned, our analysis of visa 
restrictions clearly demonstrates that states remain willing and eager to systematically 
keep out passport holders from certain nations. For passport holders from OECD 
countries the world appears in easy reach with relatively few restrictions imposed. But 
for passport holders from poor, authoritarian countries with a history of violent 
political conflict travel is and remains severely restricted. This paper’s analysis cannot 
really tell us anything on states’ actual ability to control entry and deter inward 
migration. Without doubt, the large-scale inflow of ‘illegal’ immigrants represents an 
important example of ‘the erosion of state sovereignty’ (Collinson 1996, 77). 
However, there is evidence that visa restrictions in combination with carrier sanctions 
have been effective. Neumayer (2004), for example, shows that European countries, 
which became full members to the Schengen Convention, received a lower share of 
asylum seekers. I therefore agree with Brubaker (1994, 230) that ‘seen from the 
23 outside – from the perspective of those turned down for tourist visa (…) – 
immigration control appears all too effective’. 
Visa restrictions allow states to facilitate the trans-national movement of some at 
the expense of deterring the movement of others. If mobility is one of its defining 
features, then as with many other aspects of globalisation, its realization is highly 
stratified and subject to states’ monitoring, regulation, interference and control. States 
might struggle with exercising their prerogative for thorough and comprehensive 
monitoring and control of movement in times of globalisation. But the era of 
supposedly unprecedented mobility is only part of the picture, and is at the same time 
also an era of great, continued and enforced inequality in access to foreign spaces 
based on the principle of nationality. Yeung (1998) argues that the notion of a 
borderless world has more to do with folklore than with reality, that states maintain 
their role of organizing and regulating the international flow of capital and goods and 
services, thereby asserting the continued importance of national boundaries. He 
argued this mainly with respect to the globalisation of economic activities, but the 
more this verdict is true for the cross-national movement and mobility of people. As 
Hirst and Thompson (2001) argue, ‘people are less mobile than money, goods or 
ideas, and in a sense they remain “nationalized”, dependent on passports, visas, 
residence and labour qualifications’ (257), which is why those without privileges 
cannot easily move around and why despite all the rhetoric of globalisation ‘the bulk 
of the world’s population lives in closed worlds, trapped by the lottery of birth’ (267). 
This study has made a first attempt at analysing and understanding the role of 
visa restrictions in granting unequal access to foreign spaces. Much more can and 
should be done in future research. In particular, more in-depth and qualitative studies 
should complement this necessarily broad-brush quantitative analysis. Dicken (2004) 
24 has argued that geographers are marginal at best to the wider debates on (economic) 
globalisation. Border and passport controls, visa restrictions and other features of state 
responses to the unprecedented potential for cross-national mobility in the wake of 
‘time-space compression’ deserve the attention of geographers. They form an as yet 
under-researched aspect of globalisation in the social sciences, which geographers 
must not leave almost exclusively to other disciplines for study. 
25 Appendix. Variable definitions and sources of data. 
•  Visa restriction: 1 = home country imposes visa on target country; 0 = home 
country does not impose visa restriction on target country. Source: IATA (2004). 
•  GDP p.c.: Gross Domestic Product per capita in thousand dollars of purchasing 
power parity. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
•  Restrictions to political freedom: A subjective index based on experts’ judgment 
of the extent of civil and political rights protection. Source: Freedom House 
(2004). 
•  Armed political conflict: A measure of conflict intensity, covering both civil and 
interstate conflict, based on fatality levels (0 = no conflict; 1 = conflict with more 
than 25 and less than 1000 casualties in a single year; 2 = as 1, but with an 
accumulated total above 1000 casualties; 3 = conflict with more than 1000 
casualties in a single year). Source: Strand et al. (2004). 
•  Same region: Dummy variable based on geographical location of country within 
one of seven regions used by World Bank (2004) for regional classification: 
Northern America, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe, Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and Northern Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South Asia, East Asia and the Pacific. 
•  Same civilisation: Dummy variable based on Huntington’s (1996) admittedly 
controversial classification of countries into eight civilizations (plus one residual 
category): Western, Latin American, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Islamic, African, 
Sinic, Buddhist. Source: Russett, Oneal and Cox (2000). Henderson and Tucker 
(2001) provide a slightly different classification, also based on Huntington (1996). 
Using their alternative measure has very little influence on the results. 
26 •  Colonial link: Two dummy variables are used. One is based on whether countries 
have been colonised by the same country in the past, but are not a member of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. The other is based on whether countries are members 
of the Commonwealth (plus Zimbabwe whose membership was suspended in 
2004). Source: Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Commonwealth Secretariat (2005). 
•  Bilateral trade: The value in billion US$ of bilateral trade in goods and services. 
Data refer to 1996 due to lack of more current comprehensive data. Source: Rose 
(2005). 
•  International tourism receipts: Expenditures by international inbound visitors, 
including payments to national carriers for international transport, divided by the 
value sum of exports of goods and services. Source: World Bank (2004). 
•  International outbound tourists: The number of departures per million inhabitants 
from a country to any other country for any purpose other than a remunerated 
activity in the country visited. Source: World Bank (2004). 
27 Table I. Summary descriptive variable information. 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min Max
Visa restriction (from home country on target country)  23221 0.76  0.43  0  1 
GDP p.c. (thousand $) (target country)  23221 8.2  8.6  0.48 43.8
Restrictions to political freedom (target country)  23221 6.23  3.47  2  14 
Armed political conflict (target country)  23221 0.29  0.75  0  3 
International tourism receipts % of exports (home country)2322112.06  14.85  0  70.83
International outbound tourists per mill. (target country)  23221 2.93  9.36  0  73.4
Bilateral trade (billion $)  23221 0.38  4.48  0  292.3
Same region  23221 0.17  0.37  0  1 
Same civilization  23221 0.18  0.38  0  1 
Colonial link (non-Commonwealth)  23221 0.01  0.08  0  1 
Colonial link (Commonwealth)  23221 0.06  0.24  0  1 
Restrictions to political freedom (home country)  23221 6.74  3.92  2  14 
 
28 Table II. Estimation results on visa restrictions 
 
GDP p.c. (target country)  -0.062 
 (22.86)* 
Restrictions to political freedom (target country)  0.129 
 (16.61)* 
Armed political conflict (target country)  0.204 
 (6.76)* 
International outbound tourists (target country)  -0.008 
 (5.21)* 
International tourism receipts (home country)  -0.011 
 (8.65)* 
Bilateral trade  -0.027 
 (3.18)* 
Same region  -1.037 
 (18.55)* 
Same civilization  -0.896 
 (17.71)* 
Colonial link (non-Commonwealth)  -0.017 
 (0.09) 
Colonial link (Commonwealth)  -0.950 
 (13.29)* 




Observations (dyads or country-pairs)  23221 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -9543.6 
Predicted probability  75.6% 
Actual probability  78.1% 
 
Note: Logit estimation with robust standard errors. Absolute z-statistics in 
parentheses. * statistically significant at .01 level.  
29 Table III. Predicted probabilities of visa restrictions. 
 
 At  minimum 
(zero for dummy) 
At maximum 
(one for dummy) 
GDP p.c. (target country)  88.3%  34.1% 
Restrictions to political freedom (target country)  92.7%  73.1% 
Armed political conflict (target country)  81.5%  89.1% 
International outbound tourists (target country)  82.9%  73.3% 
International tourism receipts (home country)  84.3%  70.7% 
Bilateral trade  82.6%  0.01% 
Same region  84.8%  66.3% 
Same civilization  84.6%  69.2% 
Colonial link (Commonwealth)  83.2%  65.7% 
Restrictions to political freedom (home country)  96.0%  61.8% 
 
Note: In each row, all other variables are held at mean values. 
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